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1 It is the author’s great honour and pleasure to offer felicitations to Professor Kreπimir 
Sajko on the occasion of the anniversary of his appointment by contributing the present 
article to this liber amicorum. Professor Sajko is one of the great European and interna-
tional experts in the realm of arbitration, both as an academic and theoretician and as an 
advisor on legislation (for example his involvement in the Mediation Act of 2009), in his 
role as president of the Croatian Permanent Court of Arbitration, Zagreb, and, fi nally, as 
an arbitrator of international renown. Professor Sajko has maintained his interest in the 
fi eld of arbitration to the present day, but has additionally expanded his academic and 
practical focus to mediation. Without any doubt, Professor Sajko’s interest in mediation 
is a manifestation of his quest for balance and harmony and, perhaps, also the refl ec-
tion of a certain degree of reserve, if not indeed frustration, in the face of some of the 
modern-day developments in international arbitration. It thus seemed appropriate to 
dedicate an article to him which delves into techniques aimed at reducing the duration 
and the cost of arbitration and which incorporate mediation-inspired elements.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Lengthy, time-consuming procedures resulting in high costs have long been 
and are - increasingly - a concern in international arbitration. As the ICC Com-
mission noted in its 2007 Report, “Techniques for Controlling Time and Costs in 
Arbitration”2, statistics show that “[t]he increasing and, on occasion, unnecessary 
complication of the proceedings seems to be the main explanation for the long duration 
and high cost of many international arbitrations. The longer the proceedings, the more 
expensive they will be”3.
The reasons for the tendency of arbitrations nowadays to become more 
lengthy and costly are legion. They also include behavioural factors, with 
certain lawyers and certain law fi rms regularly putting their own (economic) 
interests ahead of those of their clients. The increased (economic) power of 
large law fi rms has also led to a shift in power between those fi rms and many 
of their clients, who have either lost or given up control over their own cases.
Another reason for the protracted length of arbitral proceedings and thus 
for increased costs lies in the overstretched diaries of arbitrators. One cannot 
avoid the impression that some of the very arbitrators who delight in imposing 
rigorous timetables on parties, who limit opening statements to ten or fi fteen 
minutes, even in major cases, and who restrict claimants’ direct examination 
to a few minutes (even where the respondent has submitted important rebut-
tal evidence) are the same arbitrators who then take many months to render 
their award. Of course, it cannot be gainsaid that it will always be more pleas-
ant to exercise control and mete out discipline on others than to impose it on 
oneself. 
Arbitral institutions are currently developing a greater awareness of the ob-
ligations they owe to parties, and are beginning to exercise stronger oversight 
over arbitrators’ availability and the time-effi cient performance of their duties. 
The International Court of Arbitration of the ICC recently adopted a useful 
- and courageous - stance in this regard by requiring potential arbitrators, prior 
to their confi rmation or appointment, not only to confi rm their availability in 
general terms but to disclose the number of cases they are presently handling. 
2 ICC Commission, Techniques for Controlling Time and Costs in Arbitration, ICC Publication 
843, International Chamber of Commerce (2007).
3 ICC Commission, Techniques for Controlling Time and Costs in Arbitration, op. cit. in fn. 2, 
Introduction on page 11.
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The ICC Court adopted this policy in the face of vehement opposition by certain 
arbitration practitioners, some of whom are likely to be those same individuals 
whose failure to exercise reasonable time-management may have prompted or 
indeed necessitated the ICC’s initiative in the fi rst place. Unsurprisingly, the 
younger generation has (privately or indeed openly) applauded this initiative 
- and rightly so. The quality of university teaching and professional training in 
the fi eld of arbitration has improved and intensifi ed to such a degree over the 
last twenty to thirty years that there is no reason to limit the appointment of 
arbitrators to those above the age of forty or fi fty.
In addition to these human factors, the length and the cost of arbitral pro-
ceedings are, of course, also driven by the procedural rules followed and the 
procedural techniques applied.
In an effort to reduce the complexity and duration of proceedings, which 
unavoidably generate increased costs in arbitration, the ICC Commission has 
made a number of proposals in its Report as to the best techniques for imple-
mentation, focusing mainly on tailoring procedure in a way which expedites 
the proceedings. As the Report states, the “[t]echniques embody two underlying 
principles. First, wherever possible, the parties and the arbitral tribunal should make 
a conscious and deliberate choice early in the proceedings as to the specifi c procedures 
suitable for their case. Second, the arbitral tribunal should work proactively with the 
parties to manage the procedure from the outset of the case”4. Strong emphasis is thus 
placed on cooperation between the arbitrator(s) and parties. 
Two techniques the Report does not discuss are “fi nal offer” arbitration (also 
called “baseball” arbitration) and “sealed offer” arbitration, both of which are 
aimed at expediting arbitrations and capping costs as well as at having the 
arbitrator(s) and parties work proactively together promoting settlements. This 
paper will describe both types of arbitration and illustrate how and in what 
types of cases they may be used in order to save time and costs. 
4 ICC Commission, Techniques for Controlling Time and Costs in Arbitration, op. cit. in fn. 2, 
Introduction on page 13.
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II. “FINAL OFFER” ARBITRATION (ALSO KNOWN AS ‘BASEBALL’ 
ARBITRATION)
a) What is ‘Baseball’ or ‘Final Offer’ Arbitration?
“Baseball” or “fi nal offer” arbitration [ “FOA”]5 was an idea fi rst introduced in 
1966 by Carl Stevens, when he considered the negative effects of conventional 
arbitration.6 In fact, “Stevens introduced the idea of the ‘chilling effect’ of conventional 
arbitration and suggested that a scheme where an arbitrator was restricted to choosing 
between the fi nal offers of the parties, and was unable to compromise between them, would 
overcome this problem”. The ‘chilling effect’ 
“predicts that the availability of interest arbitration as a dispute resolution procedure 
decreases the parties’ willingness to engage in serious negotiations. Because an impasse 
will be submitted to an arbitrator, one or both parties have an incentive to refuse to 
bargain prior to the arbitration if they believe they will receive a better outcome from 
arbitration than from negotiation”7. 
Furthermore, because parties underestimate the risks in arbitration, and 
may believe that the arbitrator will simply ‘split the baby’, they “assume extreme 
positions designed to infl uence the arbitrator’s decision.8 The parties may also conclude 
that any change in their initial bargaining position will reduce the likelihood of obtaining 
a favourable award”9. Although it has been observed that ‘splitting the baby’ 
fi nds greater validity in theory than in practice,10 FOA still serves an important 
5 Also referred to as “last best offer” arbitration.
6 Carl Stevens, Is Compulsory Arbitration Compatible with Bargaining, Industrial Relations, 
Vol. 5, Issue 2 (1966) 38-52. 
7 Elissa M. Meth, Final Offer Arbitration: A Model for Dispute Resolution in Domestic and In-
ternational Disputes, American Review of International Arbitration, 10 (1999) 383-421, 
387.
8 The cost consequences of infl ated claims should act as a deterrent, but they do not, at 
least not suffi ciently, given many arbitrators’ reluctance to use their powers as to costs in 
order to sanction abusive procedural behaviour.
9 Elissa M. Meth, op. cit. in fn. 7, 387.
10 Stephanie E. Keer/Richard W. Naimark, Arbitrators Do Not ‘Split the Baby’ - Empirical 
Evidence from International Business Arbitrators, Journal of International Arbitration, Vol. 
18, Issue 5 (2001) 573-578, 574: “[in the] sample, the arbitrators rarely arrived at an award 
amount that could be interpreted as ‘splitting the baby’. In fact, the majority of awards resulted in 
outright ‘wins’ or ‘losses’ (66% of the time). Of the remaining 34% of the cases, the results were 
widely distributed, with awards from 10% to 90% of the amount claimed. This would imply that 
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role: that of reaching a settlement, and if not settlement, then forcing parties 
to move away from extreme positions.
What FOA does is to force parties to adopt a compromising approach, 
thereby arriving at a more mutually compatible view of their dispute. At the 
same time as FOA focuses the parties’ minds on compromise, it reduces the 
discretion of arbitrators, essentially vesting them only with the power to issue 
an ultimatum; indeed, “the powers of the arbitrator concerning the award are narrowed 
down to a choice between two fi nal offers submitted by the parties after a phase of fi nal 
negotiations. Without being able to adjust either offer, or to opt for a solution somewhere 
between the two, the arbitrator is bound to choose between the two”11. Because one 
party will either win or lose, “[t]he parties, aware of being exposed to the risk of not 
simply losing part of their claim in some form of compromise, and thus potentially end-
ing up somewhere close to the initial target, but losing the entire case, are each impelled 
to provide an offer that will appeal to their opponents”12. It is this risk that pushes 
parties to make a more “realistic offer in good faith”13. As a result, given the mind 
frame of concession and bargaining that FOA creates, parties are far more 
likely to reach a settlement. As such, FOA acts as a “psychological, economic, and 
political incentive for the parties to reach their own agreement”14, an incentive that 
conventional arbitration lacks. 
In American major league baseball, in which this technique was often used 
to resolve salary and employment disputes (hence the name “baseball” arbitra-
tion), a settlement rate of ninety percent was achieved. This does not mean its 
success rate is or would be as high in other kinds of disputes, but “baseball” 
arbitration is certainly an option to be considered.
arbitrators, as a rule, make decisive awards and do not ‘split the baby’”; see also, John Wood, 
Last Offer Arbitration, British Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 23, Issue 3 (1985) 414-
424, 417.
11 Christian Borris, Final Offer Arbitration from a Civil Law Perspective, Journal of Interna-
tional Arbitration, Vol. 24, Issue 3 (2007) 307-317, 308.
12 Ibid., 308.
13 Ibid., 308.
14 Elissa M. Meth, op. cit. in fn. 7, 388.
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b) The Various Manifestations of FOA
Many varieties of FOA exist: issue-by-issue15; package16; dual offer17; multi-
round18; with the stipulation of a penalty19; with the use of an independent fact-
fi nder20 and, fi nally the use of FOA for purposes of quantifi cation (only).
i) Issue-by-Issue FOA
In issue-by-issue arbitration, the various contentions in the dispute are 
individually arbitrated and fi nal offers are made in relation to each and every 
contention in the dispute. Although severance of all issues in a dispute would 
at fi rst blush appear to be the most thorough and thus most equitable way 
to resolve the dispute, where FOA is concerned, if there are too many issues 
in dispute, this raises the concern that “an arbitrator will favour middle-ground 
positions”21 and thus simply split the award between the two parties by grant-
ing each party an equal number of victories on the issues in dispute; this then 
would discourage parties to settle, as the arbitrator would no longer be left 
with a single choice between two offers but instead would be able to balance 
between the parties’ position. 
However, an even greater diffi culty with issue-by-issue FOA is that some 
issues may be interlinked and it may be diffi cult to decide which issues merit 
being decided upon individually. As Wood aptly states, “[t]here can be, no doubt, 
room for endless dispute on the concept of separate issues”22. Indeed, the mere need 
to ascertain the issues in dispute could further fuel the dispute between the 
two parties, rather than cut it short. If, at the end of the discernment process, 
there are too many issues to be decided, then this will only lengthen the arbitral 
process rather than shorten it. 
15 Elissa M. Meth, Elissa M. Meth, op. cit. in fn. 7., at 394; Christian Borris, Elissa M. 
Meth, op. cit. in fn. 11, 309.
16 Elissa M. Meth,  op. cit. in fn. 7, 394.
17 Elissa M. Meth,  op. cit. in fn. 7, 396; Christian Borris,  op. cit. in fn. 11, 311.
18 Christian Borris,  op. cit. in fn. 11, 310.
19 Ibid., 309.
20 Elissa M. Meth,  op. cit. in fn. 7, 396.
21 Christian Borris,  op. cit. in fn. 11, 310.
22 John Wood,  op. cit. in fn. 10, 419.
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If, however, there is only one issue or if there are only a few clear-cut issues 
in contention, then issue-by-issue FOA may be suitable and effective. 
ii) Package FOA 
In package arbitration, a single offer is made by each party for all issues in 
contention. This places more pressure on the parties, because the arbitrator 
does not have as much discretion. Indeed, “[t]he lack of discretion is replaced by 
high party risk: one party will have its entire offer rejected by the arbitrator. This risk 
maximises each party’s incentive to reach a negotiated settlement”23. If the parties do 
not reach a settlement, package arbitration nonetheless provides them with 
“a clear incentive to make reasonable offers”24. However, package FOA, as its name 
suggests, places all the issues in a dispute under a single blanket offer. Some 
cases do require a singling out of issues in order to come to a fairer resolution. 
Package arbitration does not allow for this. It may very well be the case that 
“the arbitrator (…) will inevitably be faced with two complicated packages [to choose 
from]. Unless he is very lucky (…) he will fi nd both packages are unsatisfactory”25. As 
Wood questions, should the only option then be for “the arbitrator to weigh the 
packages and choose the least objectionable”26? This clearly is not a suitable alterna-
tive if the parties expect an equitable and well-reasoned award.
Having said this, however, one must bear in mind that package FOA may 
an attractive alternative in the interests of saving time and money, particularly 
in simple and small/very small monetary disputes.
iii) Dual Offer FOA and Multi-Round FOA
Dual offer FOA allows the parties to submit two fi nal offers to the arbitra-
tor, so that the arbitrator then has four offers to choose from. As Meth states, 
“[t]his approach provides all involved with more information about each party’s prefer-
ences, and increases the probability that one of the offers will be attractive enough to 
23 Elissa M. Meth,  op. cit. in fn. 7, 395.
24 Christian Borris,  op. cit. in fn. 11, 309.
25 John Wood,  op. cit. in fn. 10, 419.
26 John Wood,  op. cit. in fn. 10, 419.
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induce the other to settle”27. Furthermore, as Borris notes, although “this approach 
is of little benefi t in cases involving solely monetary claims”28, in cases where there are 
non-monetary concerns, the ability to make a dual offers would mean that the 
arbitrator is able to make alternative proposals, and, as a result, “the chances of 
fi nding a solution acceptable to both sides are increased”29. 
Multi-round FOA “gives parties more opportunity to adjust their position and, 
ideally, reach a settlement. Especially if combined with a sequence of negotiation rounds 
between the offers, multi-round FOA can be instrumental in solving more complex dis-
putes”30. The problem, however, with multiple rounds is that it “leaves the parties 
with plenty of opportunity for strategic manoeuvring. A strong, risk-seeking party is likely 
to start out with a rather over-stated position, in the attempt to infl uence not only the 
arbitrator, but also the other party in the following round”31. As such, multi-round 
FOA can actually work against the goal of pushing parties towards making 
reasonable offers such that they settle, and may instead encourage them to 
strategise. Further, if the parties do not settle, both the arbitrator and other 
party may be infl uenced by the risk-taking party and as a consequence the 
more reasonable or equitable solution may not be reached when the arbitral 
award is ultimately made.
Moreover, another problematic element of multi-round FOA is that it takes 
up more time than normal FOA, and, as the ICC Report suggests, the goal 
should actually be to avoid multiple rounds, repetition of arguments, etc., in 
order to save time.32 
iv) FOA as to Quantum
 
None of the types of FOA described thus far appear to be techniques which 
are particularly appealing and generally applicable. Furthermore, the associated 
procedural risks are non-negligible. It is diffi cult to see how the varieties of FOA 
described thus far can substantially reduce the duration and the cost of arbitra-
27 Elissa M. Meth,  op. cit. in fn. 7, 396.




32 ICC Commission, Techniques for Controlling Time and Costs in Arbitration, ICC Publication 
843, International Chamber of Commerce (2007) item 44-84.
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tion. Even if it is possible to use the above-referenced techniques to achieve 
some savings in terms of time and cost, the element of gambling inherent in 
them makes it rather less likely that they will be accepted by and integrated 
within other legal cultures, such as in continental Europe.33 
However, there is one area in which FOA may be used as an innovative 
technique, fi rst in assisting the parties in reaching a settlement, and, second, 
if no settlement is reached, in speeding up the quantifi cation phase of arbitra-
tions and reducing the attendant costs.
Many arbitrations raise questions of principle (questions of contract interpreta-
tion, questions of prescription, questions of liability) and questions of quantifi ca-
tion. In such cases “bifurcation” may be advisable.34 Bifurcation of proceedings 
is one of the techniques suggested by the ICC in its Report, because bifurcation 
can “genuinely be expected to result in a more effi cient resolution of the case”35. In the fi rst 
phase, the arbitrators rule as to liability on the merits, and in the second phase, 
they render a decision on the damages to be awarded. As Meth states, “[o]ften 
liability will be based on legality, whereas damages will be based on facts. Bifurcating these 
cases and using FOA in the second stage will allow parties to focus on the legal issues in 
the liability phase without confusion by factual issues that go to damages. Once liability 
is assessed, the parties can submit the damages dispute to FOA”36. The liability phase 
of the proceedings assists good-faith parties in becoming more familiar with one 
33 This holds true with even greater force in respect of two other types of FOA: FOA with 
the stipulation of a penalty and FOA with the use of an independent fact-fi nder. In the fi rst case, 
the losing party is additionally required to bear all of the costs of the arbitration, as a pen-
alty (Elissa M. Meth, Final Offer Arbitration: A Model for Dispute Resolution in Domestic and 
International Disputes, American Review of International Arbitration (1999) 383-421, 
399), creating a “turbo effect” which is said to be “instrumental in bringing about a speedy set-
tlement” (Christian Borris, op. cit. in fn. 11, 309). However, it seems rather questionable 
whether such a “penalty” would create confi dence in such a system and whether it would 
be perceived as a method of dispute resolution that leads to fair results. The role of an 
independent fact-fi nder in FOA is described as evaluating “the proposals of each party” or mak-
ing “a recommendation that the arbitrator considers along with the parties’ fi nal offer” (Elissa M. 
Meth, op. cit. in fn. 7, 396). One wonders, however, what the purpose is of differentiating 
between an independent fact-fi nder and a - considerably downgraded - arbitrator.
34 This can be a formal bifurcation with an interim or partial award or a de-facto-bifurca-
tion with a procedural order indicating at a certain stage of the proceedings - without 
prejudice - on what basis the parties shall plead their case on quantum.
35 ICC Commission, Techniques for Controlling Time and Costs in Arbitration, op. cit. in fn. 2, 
item 41.
36 Elissa M. Meth, op. cit. in fn. 7, 415.
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another and with the arbitrator(s). Consequently, “parties can rely on the information 
they learn during phase one when they create their fi nal offers in the damages phase. In 
addition, the interactions between the parties during this phase will provide an opportunity 
for the parties to become familiar with each other and build trust”37. It is precisely this 
working relationship, created by phase one of the arbitration, that can promote 
settlement before phase two commences38. If the parties’ offers are suffi ciently 
close, this will generally lead to a quick settlement, or if phase two must be carried 
out because no settlement was reached, a just outcome can be reached relatively 
quickly based on the parties’ offer.
The distinction between a phase on liability and a phase on quantum cor-
responds in part to the distinction between “disputes of rights” and “disputes of 
interest”.39 This distinction is of importance. “[R]ights disputes are concerned with 
diffi culties of the application of rules, derived either from law or from collective agree-
ments or contracts, to particular situations.” Issues of quantifi cation, however, most 
often are “disputes of interest”. This does not mean that quantifi cation may not 
raise important and delicate legal issues, but generally speaking, quantifi cation 
involves assessments and evaluations which necessarily include a considerable 
degree of subjectivity. By trying to settle the quantum or by choosing LOA, 
the parties reduce that risk.40
c) Specifi c Situations in Which FOA Should be Considered
As already indicated, FOA is particularly useful in resolving simple mon-
etary disputes and, more generally, in the quantifi cation phase following a 
determination on liability. 
37 Ibid., 416.
38 This working relationship between the parties and the arbitrator(s) is also one of the 
main principles upon which the ICC Report was drafted, namely that the parties and 
arbitrator(s) work together to manage the procedure and outcome of the case; see ICC 
Commission, Techniques for Controlling Time and Costs in Arbitration, op. cit. in fn. 2.  Intro-
duction on page 13.
39 Ramsumair Singh, Final Offer Arbitration in Theory and Practice, Industrial Relations Jour-
nal, Vol. 16, Issue 9 (1986) 329-338, 333.
40 See John Wood, op. cit. in fn. 10, 422: “[The arbitrator’s] personality, experience and sup-
posed bias is uppermost in their minds. So power is handed to him guardedly and grudgingly. This 
is especially so since he is dealing with an interest dispute and so is much less fettered than a judge 
whose work is basically concerned with a rights issue. There can be no doubt that one of the signifi -
cant advantages of last offer arbitration is that the role of the arbitrator is considerably reduced”
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As Borris notes, “in order for the negotiation mechanism to function properly, it is 
advisable to use FOA in disputes in which the parties’ positions can be measured against 
a homogenous standard. This is usually the case when the parties’ positions can be easily 
quantifi ed in monetary terms”41. When a specifi c amount is in dispute between 
two parties, the use of FOA can lead to settlement for the following reasons: (1) 
parties know that they will save both time and money if they settle; (2) they also 
know that the offers being made genuinely refl ect the amounts that both parties 
think are reasonable; (3) animosity between the parties decreases and they are 
encouraged to work together to fi nd a resolution: (4) they possess certainty, in 
that they will be in control of the outcome, as opposed to the arbitrator; (5) 
they possess fl exibility in their negotiations which they do not if they choose 
not to settle and to arbitrate instead. 42 Even if parties choose not to settle, 
however, in monetary disputes, the use of FOA expedites the arbitral process, as 
the two parties collaborate and come to a better understanding of each other’s 
viewpoint. This may help to limit submissions, witnesses, rounds, fact-fi nding 
inquiries, etc., which render the arbitration more costly and lengthy.
In addition, FOA may be an appropriate technique for the adaptation of 
long-term contracts, such as long-term delivery contracts, where the principle 
of adaptation is either agreed between the parties or ordered by the arbitrator 
but the extent of the adaptation is disputed.
Similarly, FOA is also advantageous in disputes where losses are specula-
tive in nature. For instance, in cases where there has been a breach of contract 
or non-performance of a contract for reasons of, say, frustration, hardship, or 
impracticability, the parties may be inclined to claim an exaggerated sum from 
the other party because the losses they have suffered are merely speculation as 
to what might have been. Since parties are more likely to exaggerate their losses 
in such cases, FOA would provide incentive for parties to limit their claims to 
a reasonable amount.43
Finally, FOA is considered to be particularly useful in intellectual property 
[“IP”]-related arbitrations. In IP-related disputes, “[b]ecause of the complexity of the 
issues and the vast range of projected values for IP, disputants have extremely divergent 
perception of damages. The result is diffi culty in reaching a settlement, which subjects the 
41 Christian Borris, op. cit. in fn. 11, 316.
42 Elissa M. Meth, op. cit. in fn. 7, 411-413.
43 Ibid., 418.
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parties to lengthy and expensive litigation”44. As a consequence, the “[u]se of FOA as 
a form of alternative dispute resolution could be highly effective in the fi eld of IP, because 
parties in this context have an extraordinarily high interest in rapid resolution. Typical 
IP litigants wish to quickly conclude their disputes so they may exploit market trends, 
fads, and avoid obsolescence of certain technological media and content”45. 
III. SEALED OFFER ARBITRATION
a) What is Sealed Offer Arbitration?
A sealed offer [“SOA”] is a 
“written offer to settle a dispute which has been referred to arbitration made ‘without 
prejudice save as to costs’. What distinguishes the sealed offer from an ordinary offer 
to settle a dispute is the cost penalty (…) which the arbitral tribunal is expected to 
attach to it, against the offeree who does not accept the offer and fails subsequently 
to achieve a more favourable award by continuing the proceedings”46.
This is a way to provide parties with an incentive to settle: “[i]t is well 
recognised that the risk of an adverse award of costs provides great incentive to settle a 
dispute, whether in litigation or arbitration”47. This notion is not new in common 
law countries; indeed, although one could say that the “loser pays principle is 
ingrained into the psyche of the English litigator and that of those who practise in the 
many common law countries which follow this principle, e.g. Australia”48, SOA has 
been used to combat the imbalances that arise due to the use of this principle 
so that, instead, the party likely to be the losing party may cap its potential 
costs.49 Within Europe, a different approach is taken towards cost awards: “[i]n 
countries such as Austria, Germany, Sweden, and Switzerland, the civil procedure rules 
44 Spencer B. Gordon, Final-Offer Arbitration in the New Era of Major League Baseball, Journal 
of American Arbitration, Vol. 6 (2007), 153-180, 175.
45 Ibid., 175.
46 Poupak Anjomshoaa, Cost awards in international arbitration and the use of “sealed offers” to 
limit liability for costs, International Arbitration Law Review, Vol. 10, Issue 2 (2007) 1.
47 Jonathon Wood, Protection Against Adverse Costs’ Awards in International Arbitration, The 
Journal of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, Vol. 74 (2008) 139-147, 141.
48 Ibid., 141.
49 Michael Bühler, Awarding Costs in International Commercial Arbitration: an Overview, ASA 
Bulletin, Vol. 22, Issue 2 (2004), 249-279, 263.
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require a proportional allocation refl ecting each party’s relative success of the claims and 
defences. The same approach is prevalent in the arbitration practice in those countries”50. 
There is a notably different tradition in the U.S., where requiring costs to be 
borne evenly between the two parties is more common.51 
Sealed offer arbitration can be a useful tool to cut time and costs in arbitra-
tion. Disputes as to costs contribute to rendering arbitrations lengthier and 
more expensive.52 Therefore, in order to save time and money in arbitration, 
one way of expediting costs proceedings is sealed offer arbitration. 
Furthermore, the spectre of cost claims and cost issues as well as the expec-
tation that the arbitrators may split the costs 50/50 may hinder settlements. 
Sealed offer arbitration, much like FOA, induces parties to negotiate prior to 
the arbitration, since it signifi cantly increases the stakes of losing the arbitra-
tion. It encourages and may often lead to settlement, avoiding the costs and 
time of arbitration altogether.
b) SOA’s Development in English Law
Sealed offer arbitration originated from the Calderbank letter. This was an 
offer “expressed to be ‘without prejudice, save as to costs’ [and] was fi rst developed in 
relation to claims for fi nancial relief in matrimonial cases where settlements are more 
complex, involving the sale of matrimonial assets and their division among the parties”53. 
Thus, if the individual who lost the case had previously put in a sealed offer 
more advantageous to the other side than the judge’s or arbitrator’s decision, 
then that party would not have to bear the costs of the winning party in addi-
tion to his/her own. It then became a popular procedure and began to be used 
for other kinds of dispute. The notion of the Calderbank letter can now be found 
in Part 36 of the English Civil Procedure Rules. The way it works is that 
“the offer is inadmissible and therefore not to be seen by the tribunal until issues of 
liability and quantum have been decided. The party making the offer is claiming 
50 Ibid., 262.
51 Poupak Anjomshoaa, op. cit. in fn. 46, 2.
52 See Poupak Anjomshoaa, op. cit. in fn. 46, 2: “[a]s noted by Derains and Schwartz, increas-
ingly claims for the reimbursement of costs constitute a substantial part of the relief sought in ICC 
arbitrations; in large arbitrations, it is not uncommon for cost claims to total several million US 
dollars”.
53 Jonathon Wood, op. cit. in fn. 47, 142.
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privilege in respect of the offer, subject to the express reservation of the right to bring 
the offer to the notice of the tribunal on the issue of costs should the offer prove to be 
unacceptable to the other party”54. 
This method is used frequently in England55; indeed, it is even noted in 
model arbitration rules for particular industries, like in the Construction In-
dustry Model Arbitration Rules of the Joint Contracts Tribunal Ltd.56 
Originating with the Calderbank letter, the notion of sealed offer arbitration 
has been developed further and is now very commonly used in English domestic 
arbitrations. Its defi nition was fi rst outlined in the Tramountana Armadora S.A. 
v. Atlantic Shipping Co S.A. case.57
Because the ‘loser pays all’ or ‘costs follow the event’ principle results in 
an unreasonable award, as “even where the loser may have defeated the winner on a 
number of points and the recovery of the latter is signifi cantly less than the amount origi-
nally claimed, so long as the recovery is for more than a nominal amount”58, the loser 
must still bear both the costs of the winning party and its own. As such, SOA 
became a very popular mechanism “devised specifi cally to counteract this seemingly 
harsh approach to allocating costs”59. The losing party, often the respondent, can 
alleviate the result of this approach by
 
54 Ibid., 142.
55 Jonathon Wood, op. cit. in fn. 47, at 142.
56 Rule 13.9: “In allocating costs the arbitrator shall have regard to any offer of settlement or com-
promise from either party, whatever its description or form. The general principle which the arbitra-
tion should follow is that a party who recovers less overall than was offered to him in settlement or 
compromise should recover the costs which he would otherwise have been entitled to recover only up to 
the date on which it was reasonable for him to have accepted the offer, and the offeror should recover 
his costs thereafter”.
57 Jonathon Wood, op. cit. in fn. 47, 142.: “A ‘sealed’ offer is the arbitral equivalent of making a 
payment into court in settlement of the litigation or of particular causes of action in that litigation. 
Neither the fact, nor the amount, of such a payment into court can be revealed to the judge trying 
the case until he has given judgment on all matters other than costs. As it is customary for an award 
to deal at one and the same time with both parties’ claims and the question of costs, the existence of 
a sealed offer has to be brought to the attention of the arbitrator before he has reached a decision. 
However, it should remain sealed at that stage and it would be wholly improper for the arbitrator 
to look at it before he has reached a fi nal decision on the matters in dispute other than as to costs, 
or to revise that decision in the light of the terms of the sealed offer when he sees them”.
58 Poupak Anjomshoaa, op. cit. in fn. 46, 3.
59 Ibid., 3.
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“making a ‘sealed’ settlement offer in the course of the arbitration. Such offer will 
not be revealed to the tribunal until the substantive issue have been decided. Only 
then is it ‘opened’: if the arbitrator fi nds that the claimant would have recovered the 
same or more by accepting the offer, the claimant is to recover his costs up to the time 
when the offer could have been accepted, but is to pay the respondent’s costs incurred 
for the period after that time”60.
Equally, a claimant who over the course of the arbitration concludes that 
he may not obtain as favourable an outcome as requested in the arbitration 
may put in a sealed offer for settlement to the respondent. If the respondent 
refuses to settle, then the claimant may notify the arbitrator that he put in a 
sealed offer before the arbitrator has made her decision. When the decision 
has been made, the arbitrator may open the sealed offer, and if she fi nds that 
the respondent would have had to pay less in damages if he had accepted the 
claimant’s offer, then the arbitrator may impose on the respondent must bear 
the claimant’s full costs from the point at which the respondent could have 
accepted the offer.
Described as a “mechanism crucial in any forum where costs are awarded in ac-
cordance with the English principle that ‘costs follow the event’”61, SOA is increasingly 
being used in Hong Kong, Canada, and Australia.62
c) The Potential Use of SOA in International Arbitration
In international arbitration, a relevant number of arbitrators follow the 
‘loser pays all’ or the ‘costs follow the event’ principle. Indeed, “[s]ome recently 
published arbitral decisions hold that according to ‘general principles’ or ‘in accordance 
with basic procedural principles followed in arbitration’, the costs of the arbitration should 
be borne by the party which loses the arbitration”63. The principle is outlined in the 
arbitration laws of certain countries, for instance, in the English Arbitration 
Act 1996, Section 61(2)64.
60 Michael Bühler, op. cit. in fn. 49, 263.
61 Poupak Anjomshoaa, op. cit. in fn. 47, 3.
62 Ibid., 3.
63 Michael Bühler, op. cit. in fn. 49, 259.
64 See Poupak Anjomshoaa, op. cit. in fn. 46, 2: “under the AAA International Arbitration 
Rules, the LCIA Arbitration Rules, the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, and the Rules of the 
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There is no doubt that this is not a universal rule in international arbitra-
tion,65 and that there continue to be variances, and these variances depend 
largely on the national backgrounds of the arbitrators.66 Continental arbitrators 
will often opt towards a costs award based on the proportion by which each 
party has won or lost, American arbitrators will take an ‘each pay their own’ 
approach. Indeed, as Fouchard, Gaillard, and Goldman note, 
“[i]t is increasingly common for the arbitral tribunal to order the party which is 
defeated on the merits of a dispute to pay all or a substantial part of the costs of the 
arbitration. That is traditionally the practice in some common law countries and now 
frequently occurs when the arbitral tribunal has its seat in continental jurisdictions 
such as France or Switzerland”67.
In light of this movement in international arbitration, SOA provides a 
mechanism for those parties who consider themselves to be at risk due to the 
use of this approach as a way to cap their costs. SOA is also helpful in the 
“each pay their own” - systems which many rightly consider to be fundamen-
tally unfair when the arbitrators are likely to adopt a proportionality-approach 
rather than the more rigid “loser pays all”- approach, SOA is still a useful tool 
to limit the cost risk, to favour settlements and to render the arbitral process 
more effi cient.
d) Advantages to Sealed Offer Arbitration
The advantages of SOA are evident. Firstly, SOA is more likely to result in 
an equitable cost award than the ‘loser pays all’ principle. Secondly, for the 
party that feels it may lose the award, it provides that party with a mechanism 
Arbitration Institute of the SCC, there is a general expectation that the legal costs of the ‘successful 
party’ will form part of the award on costs with the ‘losing party’ being ordered to compensate the 
successful party for its reasonable legal and other costs”. See also Hunter/Landau, The English 
Arbitration Act 1996: Text and Notes (1998), 52 footnote 97: “Although this section provides 
as a general rule that the winning party should be entitled to recover its costs, the exception confers 
very wide power on the tribunal in the way in which its discretion is exercised.”
65 Michael Bühler, op. cit. in fn. 49, 260.
66 Poupak Anjomshoaa, op. cit. in fn. 46, 2.
67 Philippe Fouchard/Emanuel Gaillard/Berthold Goldman, International Commercial Arbi-
tration (1999) 686.
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by which to cap its costs in the arbitration.68 Indeed, SOA provides “invaluable 
ammunition to those who have no choice but to defend exaggerated or unduly infl ated 
claims brought against them”69. Thirdly, it presents both parties with the incen-
tive to compromise. The party most likely to lose the case is inclined to put in 
a sealed offer before the arbitration ends, and the party making a claim is less 
likely to exaggerate or infl ate its claim. SOA “encourage[es] (…) both parties to 
make their claims as realistic as possible and thus facilitates settlements”70.
In the context of the ICC Report of 2007 on making arbitrations shorter 
and cost-effective, SOA is an easy and effective way of allocating costs. Fur-
thermore, in terms of quickening the arbitral process, it prevents either party 
from making exaggerated claims, because if they do, it is likely that there will 
be a consequence; namely, they will have to bear extra costs. This encourages 
parties to act in good faith during the arbitration, which in turn results in an 
avoidance of unnecessary procedural steps (submissions, hearings, witness 
statements, fact-fi nding inquiries, etc.) which lengthen the arbitral process 
and make it costlier. In addition, it pushes parties (and their lawyers) to settle, 
because bearing costs is a risk that parties often do not want to take.
e) Disadvantages to Sealed Offer Arbitration
One disadvantage to SOA is that it may lead to a bifurcation of the pro-
ceedings, which may in fact end up lengthening the arbitral process. An award 
on costs usually is not separately conducted: “the general practice in international 
arbitration is to decide both issues together. Especially in the ICC regime, with its scru-
tiny process of any award rendered, such a split may be overly burdensome unless the 
amount of costs at stake justifi es a separate fi nal award on costs”71. SOA is conducive 
to bifurcating awards because the arbitrator(s) must fi rst make a decision on 
the merits of the case before opening the sealed offer and subsequently decid-
ing the costs issue. However, how much this would lengthen the process is 
questionable. Often the request for an immediate decision on costs delays the 
issuing of the decision on the main claims, so that the postponement of the cost 
68 Poupak Anjomshoaa, op. cit. in fn. 46, 3.
69 Ibid., 3.
70 Michael Bühler, op. cit. in fn. 49, 269.
71 Michael Bühler, op. cit. in fn. 49, 263.
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decision should speed up the issuing of the award. In SOA the only additional 
procedural step is to open the sealed offer and decide the costs accordingly. 72 
Another problem is that some arbitrators and parties may not be aware of 
SOA and how exactly it functions. Because 
“parties from civil law [and other] jurisdictions will not be accustomed with the 
‘sealed offers’ practice[, … it is imperative that] (…) a tribunal intending to adopt 
the English approach should thus inform the parties at the very outset of the proceed-
ings that they may submit such offers, and that the tribunal intends to take them 
into consideration when deciding on costs”73.
The importance of making clear to all parties involved what exactly SOA 
entails is hugely important, particularly in making clear the fact that the of-
fer is made “without prejudice, save as to costs”. In certain arbitrations, SOA has 
been rejected as a mechanism where one party has attempted to use it against 
another because the consequences of refusing an offer under SOA were not 
well explained to the other party.74
Furthermore, SOA has been accused of being too exacting as an approach. 
As Bühler states, “[a]ll in all, an allocation of costs based on the outcome of the case 
rarely can or should be a strict arithmetic exercise. Although arbitrators should not use 
‘too broad a brush’, pointillism is of no use either”75. Accordingly, Bühler argues that 
the approach that should be used should depend on the case at hand.
A further disadvantage is the fact that the use of SOA takes away from the 
reason for which the ‘loser pays all’ principle is used, which is that it “provides 
economically effi cient deterrence for such conduct and furthers compliance with contractual 
obligations”76. However, this rule assumes that all arbitral disputes are black and 
white and that there is a distinct victim and a violator, winner and loser, in the 
case, which is not always so.
The potential of infl uencing the arbitrator by making a sealed offer is yet 
another disadvantage of SOA. The party that is making the sealed offer may 
be afraid that the arbitrator will think that it is accepting liability by making 
the offer. This discourages parties from participating in SOA, and if it is true 
72 Indeed, the ICC Report explicitly suggests that bifurcation can be a good way to expedite 
the arbitral procedure; see ICC Commission, Techniques for Controlling Time and Costs in 
Arbitration, op. cit. in fn. 2, item 41.
73 Michael Bühler, op. cit. in fn. 49, 264.
74 Jonathon Wood, op. cit. in fn. 47, 145-146.
75 Michael Bühler, op. cit. in fn. 49, 265.
76 Ibid., 268.
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that the arbitrator is infl uenced, it may lead to a biased award being handed 
down. But as Anjomshoaa notes, 
“[a]ny sophisticated arbitral tribunal should appreciate that an offer of compromise 
may have been made simply because the offeror is keen to remove any uncertainty 
from its accounts, for commercial or other reasons, and despite the lack of any belief 
in the merits of the compromised claims. Equally, the tribunal cannot dismiss the 
possibility of the offer being one to settle the offeree’s claims for a nominal sum, aimed 
solely at obtaining some costs protection”77.
It is therefore unlikely that if a party decides to put in a sealed offer, such 
a decision will be held against it.
On balance, the advantages of SOA clearly outweigh its potential disad-
vantages.
IV. CONCLUSION
Both FOA and SOA foster an environment of compromise between the parties 
to a dispute, making it more likely that the dispute will end in settlement. This is 
the main aim of these two kinds of arbitration. When these kinds of arbitration 
continue through to the arbitration stage, they encourage the parties to act in 
good faith with one another so that they may avoid unnecessary and repetitive 
steps in the arbitration, which are often taken when parties act unreasonably, 
and instead want to over-exaggerate their claims. If used wisely, both FOA and 
SOA can be instrumental to cutting time and costs in arbitration, as well as re-
introducing an approach which is collaborative rather than adversarial.
77 Poupak Anjomshoaa, op. cit. in fn. 46, 5.
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Sadræaj
Andreas Reiner*
KONA»NA PONUDA I ZAPE»AΔENA PONUDA KAO SREDSTVO 
SMANJIVANJA VREMENA I TRO©KA ARBITRAÆE
U Ëlanku se raspravlja o dvjema tehnikama koje arbitraæu Ëine uËinkovitijom te 
smanjuju njezine troπkove, ali i usmjeravaju arbitre i stranke na zajedniËko aktivno 
ostvarivanje nagodbe. Te tehnike su arbitraæa na temelju konaËne ponude (“fi nal offer” 
arbitration, “baseball” arbitration) te arbitraæa na temelju zapeËaÊene ponude (“sealed 
offer” arbitration). 
U prvome dijelu Ëlanka defi nira se arbitraæa na temelju konaËne ponude te se na-
vode argumenti u korist i protiv takve tehnike, a defi nira se i uloga arbitra u toj vrsti 
postupka. Uz to, predstavlja se i nekoliko vrsta arbitraæe na temelju konaËne ponude: 
arbitraæa problem po problem (issue-by-issue), paket (package), dvostruka ponuda (dual 
offer), arbitraæa u viπe krugova (multi-round), arbitraæa s odreenjem kazne (with the 
stipulation of a penalty), arbitraæa putem nezavisnog utvrivanja Ëinjenica (with the 
use of an independent fact-fi nder) i, konaËno, arbitraæa s ciljem izraËunavanja visine 
dosuenoga (for purposes of quantifi cation). Takoer, naznaËuju se i podruËja u kojima 
bi se ta tehnika mogla koristiti - jednostavni novËani sporovi te faza izraËunavanja visine 
dosuenoga nakon utvrenja osnovanosti zahtjeva. 
Drugi dio Ëlanka odnosi se na arbitraæu temeljenu na zapeËaÊenoj ponudi, koja se 
defi nira te se iznose njezine prednosti i mane. Uz to, objaπnjava se razvoj ove tehnike u 
engleskom pravu.
ZakljuËuje se kako navedene tehnike sluæe arbitraæi na mnogo naËina - poveÊavaju 
uËinkovitost, pojeftinjuju je te potiËu postizanje nagodbe izmeu stranaka. 
KljuËne rijeËi: meunarodna arbitraæa, vrijeme i troπak arbitraæe, arbitraæa na 
temelju konaËne ponude, arbitraæa na temelju zapeËaÊene ponude
* Dr. Andreas Reiner, arbitar, izmiritelj, odvjetnik, OdvjetniËko druπtvo Andreas Reiner 
& Partners, Freyms 6112, BeË, naslovni profesor SveuËiliπta za ekonomiju i poslovanje, 
Angasse 2-6, BeË
